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 1 
Summary 
Intellectual Property Rights gives an inventor an exclusive right of 
exploitation and its objective is to create an incentive for companies to 
improve existing products or develop entirely new products. However, even 
if a firm is granted an IPR there is a possibility, that while enjoying them, 
the use may be in conflict with competition law. Accordingly, competition 
law may limit the scope of an IPR, working as a “second tier”. The interface 
between the two systems of law actualizes on the one hand, the necessity to 
preserve the incentive for innovators to develop new products; on the other 
hand, it actualizes the importance of free competition, which may be 
restricted by the use of an IPR. Both EU and US law acknowledge IPRs as 
an important incentive for investment and innovation and a common 
objective for EU and US competition law is to achieve consumer welfare. 
Nonetheless, the EU approach also has to take in consideration the 
realization of an internal market, which is an objective not shared with the 
US. Although compulsory licensing of an IPR could amount to excessive 
interference with a firm’s proprietary rights, both the Supreme Court and the 
CJEU have found situations, in which a firm has been compelled to license 
its IPR and where the refusal to license has been seen as an abusive conduct 
in contrast to competition law. Additionally, EU law presumes that an 
abusive conduct is in contrast to competition law, with possibilities to 
exempt or justify such conduct either under block exemption regulations or 
Article 101.3 TFEU; US law instead distinguishes between conduct either 
prohibited per se or treated under the rule of reason and seeing to whether 
the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that 
outweigh anticompetitive effects. In conclusion, the approach of the two 
systems of law differ, where the CJEU has went with a more formalistic 
approach rather than the rule of reason applied by the Supreme Court. 
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Sammanfattning 
En immaterialrätt ger en upphovsman en exklusiv rätt att utnyttja sin 
uppfinning. Syftet är att skapa incitament för företag att förbättra befintliga 
produkter eller att skapa helt nya produkter. En sådan rättighet innebär 
emellertid inte att upphovsmannen åtnjuter ett totalt skydd att ensam få 
utnyttja sin exklusiva rättighet och utövandet kan i vissa fall anses stå i strid 
med konkurrensrättslig lagstiftning. Följaktligen kan konkurrensrätten 
innebära en begränsning av en beviljad intellektuell rättighet. Relationen 
mellan immaterialrätt och konkurrensrätt aktualiserar, å ena sidan, 
nödvändigheten av att bevara incitament for upphovsmän att fortsätta 
utveckla nya produkter, å andra sidan, betydelsen av fri konkurrens, vilken 
kan begränsas av ett utövande av en immaterialrätt. Både EU och USA 
erkänner immaterialrätter som ett viktigt incitament för innovation och 
investering och ett gemensamt syfte för europeisk och amerikansk 
konkurrensrätt är att säkerställa konsumenters välfärd. Även om 
tvångslicensering skulle kunna innebära ett orimligt intrång i en 
immaterialrätt förvärvad av ett företag, har både europeisk och amerikansk 
praxis konstaterat situationer där ett företag har blivit tvunget att licensera 
sina immaterialrätter. Vidare förutsätter EU-rätten som utgångspunkt att ett 
missbruk av en dominerande ställning strider mot konkurrensrätten, oavsett 
eventuella postiva effekterna av ett sådant agerande. Till detta finns 
möjligheter att tillåta agerandet, antingen genom blockundantagsregler eller 
genom att rättfärdiga agerandet enligt Artikel 101.3 FEUF. 
Sammanfattningsvis, har de båda lagstiftningarna kommit att utvecklas i två 
olika riktningar där EU-domstolens praxis antyder ett mer formellt synsätt i 
jämförelse med USA:s högsta domstol som snarare använder sig av ett 
“Rule of Reason-test”. 
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Abbreviations 
EAGCP  Economic Advisory Group on Competition 
Policy 
EU  European Union 
CJEU  Court of Justice of the European Union 
CFI  Court of First Instance 
IPR  Intellectual Property Right 
TEU  Treaty on the European Union 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 General Introduction 
Globalization is an inevitable and indispensable economic, cultural and 
political process, which has global integration as its objective and to bring 
the world’s different countries closer together. With that in regard, certain 
efforts are required in order to facilitate the adaption to a more globalized 
world. This means, not least, that different areas of law will be subject to 
international harmonization while firms are trying to acquire an 
international position on the global market. Since the USA constitutes more 
than half of what is called the worldwide market,1 it is attractive for firms, 
which are trying to establish an international position, to also be present on 
the American market. This has recently resulted the EU and the US to 
initiate negotiations for a potential Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). The TTIP would aim at increasing growth and create 
jobs, while at the same time boost world economy.2 A comparative 
perspective between the EU and the US is thus relevant, not only, due to the 
influence the US holds on the world market, but also due to the fact that 
IPRs and competition law are two bodies of law, where the US has had 
more experience in dealing with issues concerning this subject.  
 
One of the toughest issues to handle, where EU and US legislation differs, is 
the barrier behind custom borders and an important legal area where they 
have been shown to have two different approaches is the interface between 
IPRs and competition law. The research and investment leading up to a 
product, for which there is a consumer demand, generally equal extensive 
work and money by a firm, before an IPR is granted. When a firm has been 
granted an IPR, it allows the owner to prevent third parties from 
unauthorized use and exploit the IPR by, inter alia, licensing. However, 
                                                
1 Möschel, Wernhard, US versus EU Antitrust Law, p. 3 
2 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/ 
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such research and investment may be lost if the use of the IPR is considered 
to be in contrast to competition law. Nevertheless, the two areas of law 
share the same objective, i.e. promoting innovation and economic growth. 
Provided a firm has been granted an IPR, should it not be reasonable to 
assume that the product in question is protected and that all the hard work 
and money will result in a freedom of conduct for the firm to exploit the IPR 
in whichever way it wants?   
1.2 Purpose and Presentation of Questions 
The EU and the US approach the interface between IPRs and competition 
law from two different perspectives, although recent European development 
implies a proximity to the American point of view. The purpose of this 
bachelor thesis is to investigate how the EU and the US have chosen to 
approach the interface between IPRs and competition law, with focus on 
when compulsory licensing may constitute an abuse of a dominant position 
within the scope of Article 102 TFEU. In my presentation the following 
questions will be investigated: 
 
I. How do the two bodies of law, i.e. IPRs and competition law interact 
under EU law and US law? 
II. What are the preconditions for compulsory licensing under EU law? 
III. How do the two sides of the Atlantic approach the relationship 
between IPRs and competition law, with regards to compulsory 
licensing?  
IV. What problems may arise from the different approaches? 
1.3 Method and Material 
Customary legal dogmatic method is a definition, for which it has been 
found difficult to establish a homogenous factual content.3 Therefore, the 
method and material used will instead be described as a scientific 
                                                
3 Sandgren, Claes, Är rättsdogmatiken dogmatisk?, p. 649 
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reconstruction of legal systems.4 In writing this bachelor thesis, primary and 
secondary legislation, case law, guidelines and doctrine will be studied. This 
will constitute an effort to systematize and structure relevant legislation in 
order to dissect the chosen subject and in the analysis illustrate the 
similarities and differences between the EU and US legal situation. Given 
the purpose of answering the questions from a comparative perspective, the 
main focus will be EU law whereas US law foremost will work as an 
abstract to provide the reader with an understanding of its approach to the 
subject. The material used for the investigation of the relationship between 
IPRs and competition law has mainly constituted guidelines used by 
authorities and case law in order to reflect actual situations where the use of 
an IPR have been subject to competition scrutiny and how EU authorities 
and US agencies would assess such conduct. 
1.4 Delimitations 
The interface between IPRs and competition law is a complex area of law. 
This bachelor thesis has therefore been delimited to focus on when the use 
of an IPR may be considered as an abuse of a dominant position within the 
meaning of Article 102 TFEU. The Article sets out three criteria for its 
application. The thesis will however only focus on the two first criteria, only 
briefly commenting on the third criteria, which states that trade between 
Member States, must be affected. Moreover, the possibilities of compulsory 
licensing under the TRIPS agreement and Paris convention and the 
preconditions to force a license of a firm’s IPR as set out by these 
agreements, will not be investigated. The thesis has also been delimited to 
consider relevant case law concerning refusals to license. Compulsory 
licensing has raised questions of whether the CJEU has tried to integrate the 
essential facilities doctrine into the field of IPRs. This is an issue, which will 
not be investigated by this thesis. Moreover, an IPR is an exclusive right, 
which also requires economical aspects to be considered. However, given 
the scope of this thesis, these will only be commented on as far as 
                                                
4 Jareskog, Nils, Rättsdogmatik som vetenskap, SvJT 2004 p. 4 
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necessary. It has also been presupposed that the reader is familiar with the 
fundamental principles of EU law. 
1.5 Outline 
To give the reader a complete understanding of the chosen subject it is 
important to understand the interface between IPR and competition law. 
Chapter 2 will provide the reader with a general introduction of what 
constitutes an IPR in combination with relevant EU legislation, followed by 
a review of competition law under both EU and US law, which will 
illustrate the circumstances under which the two bodies of law overlap. The 
investigation will then continue with an introduction to the EU and the US 
system of competition law and with a study of the cross-Atlantic 
development of IPR in relation to competition law. This will give the reader 
a comprehensive overview of the subject. Chapter 3 will investigate the 
preconditions for compulsory licensing under EU law. This will be followed 
by a case study, which will illustrate the circumstances under which the EU 
and the US have chosen to compel an undertaking to license its protected 
IPR. Finally, Chapter 4 will summarize the findings of the investigation and 
address the similarities and differences between the EU and US approach in 
order to conclude what the reasons for the different development may be, as 
well as to reflect on what problems might arise from the different 
approaches. 
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2 The Relationship between IPR 
and Competition Law 
Intellectual property legislation offers a possibility for an inventor to acquire 
a right of exclusive use and exploitation, which operates both as an 
incentive to other innovators, stimulated by the spread of information and to 
put knowledge into the public domain that might otherwise remain a trade 
secret.5 Competition law, on the other hand, is designed to stimulate 
innovation and economic growth by fostering effective competition in 
markets, creating an environment where allocative and productive 
efficiencies are produced. Allocative efficiencies presuppose that the price 
mechanism will ensure that producers manufacture the products that 
consumers want, while productive efficiencies will result producers to price 
their products closer to its costs due to the pressure of price competition.6 
Historically, IPR and competition law has passed as two separate systems of 
law but as seen above, there is a considerable overlap between their 
objectives both aiming to promote innovation and economic growth.7 
Nevertheless, there is also an inherent conflict between IPR and competition 
law. While IPR protects the interest of the inventor, competition law instead 
protects the necessity of a free market, which might be limited by an IPR.8  
2.1 Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual Property is a generic term, which covers both industrial and 
artistic forms of property right, such as patents, trademarks, copyright, trade 
names and indications of origin.9 Furthermore, Intellectual Property is an 
intangible property, which means that any number of people simultaneously 
                                                
5 Anderman, Steven, The competition law/IP ’interface’: an introductory note, p. 1  
6 Anderman, Steven, Schmidt, Hedvig, EU Competition Law and Intellectual Property 
Rights, p. 14 
7 Anderman, Steven, The competition law/IP ’interface’: an introductory note, pp. 1 f. 
8 Myers, Gary, Principles of Intellectual Property Law, p. 7 
9 Craig, Paul, De Búrca, Gráinne, EC Law, Text, Cases and Materials, p. 1027 
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can use such property without stopping anyone else’s use.10 Article 36 and 
345 TFEU jointly provide that it is the Member States, which govern the 
system of property ownership and that EU rules on competition do not 
preclude prohibitions or restrictions affecting the internal market when such 
actions are justified by the protection of industrial and commercial property. 
The CJEU later established in Consten & Grundig11 that such property also 
included intellectual property. The ultimate aim for IPR according to US 
law is to stimulate artistic creativity for the general good, where IPR is 
regarded as a private mean to accomplish a public end.12 
2.2 EU Competition Law and the Internal 
Market 
EU competition law has been interpreted to have three main objectives, 
which are the maintenance of effective competition, the application of a fair 
competition, in particular in the form of protection for small and medium-
sized firms, and the use of competition rules for the realization of an internal 
market.13 The European approach to abusive conduct by a dominant 
undertaking is found in Article 102 TFEU, which is an outright prohibition 
with possibilities to exempt or justify the abuse through either block 
exemption regulations or Article 101.3 TFEU. Accordingly, there is a 
presumption of competition liability within EU competition law, with 
possibilities to exempt or justify certain conduct on the market.  
 
Furthermore, Article 3.3 TEU provides that one of the objectives of the EU 
is to establish an internal market. According to Article 26 TFEU, this shall 
comprise an area without internal frontiers to ensure the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital. Consequently, market integration has 
been one of the major influences on the application of EU competition 
                                                
10 Peritz, Rudolph, Competition Policy and IPRs in the USA, pp. 126 f. 
11 Joined cases C-56/64 and C-58/64, Consten & Grundig v Commission, [1966] ECR 299 
12 Peritz, Rudolph, p. 127 
13 Anderman, Steven, Schmidt, Hedvig, p. 25 
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laws.14 As a mean to accomplish an internal market, Article 3.1(b) TFEU 
sets out that the EU has exclusive competence for the establishment of 
necessary competition rules for the functioning of the internal market. It has 
also been laid down by Protocol 27 of the Treaty that the internal market 
includes a system, which will ensure that competition is not distorted. 
However, according to Article 118 TFEU, it is the Member States who have 
been given the competence to regulate IPR, which leaves IPR to remain a 
national concern. But even if IPR mainly is a national concern, the Article 
also sets out that the European authorities have an obligation to establish a 
uniform protection for IPRs throughout the internal market in accordance 
with national legislation. When carrying out activities for the purposes set 
out in Article 3 TEU, both European authorities and Member States are 
required to adopt an economic policy, which involves conduct in accordance 
with the principle of an open market with free competition according to 
Article 119 TFEU. 
2.3 US Antitrust Law and its Objective 
The US antitrust laws aim to ensure a competitive environment, and in 1958 
the Supreme Court stated that,  
 
“[the] Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive 
charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and 
unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the 
premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces 
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, and 
lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material 
progress, while at the same time providing an environment 
conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and 
social institutions.”15   
 
                                                
14 Korah, Valentine, Competition Law of the European Union, Section 3-7 
15 See Northern Pacific Railway Co v United States, 356 US 1 (1958) 
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The US agencies and courts have, after this judgment, applied antitrust law 
as a mean to achieve consumer welfare as the overachieving goal. A 
competitive environment is held to result in a market where competitors are 
driven to improve existing products or introduce new products in order to 
keep their market share. In that sense, the antitrust laws foster competition 
by, inter alia, prohibit exclusionary uses of monopoly power.16  
 
Just as Article 102 TFEU, Section 2 of the Sherman Act targets unilateral 
practice of one or several firms, which already have acquired monopoly 
power or, hold a dominant position or, attempt to obtain monopoly power. 
However, a lawfully acquired monopoly position is not considered to be in 
contrast to US antitrust laws.17 The US competition law is structured, inter 
alia, through “per se” prohibitions based on case law experience, which has 
demonstrated harmful consequences on the market. These activities 
normally do not require any in-depth investigation concerning effects on the 
relevant market.18 Such activities which are considered to go beyond 
acceptable includes, predatory pricing, acquisition of direct rivals, long-term 
lease arrangements with penalty clauses if loyalty is breached, and refusals 
to deal for no business purpose other than to injure a competitor.19 Cases 
concerning IPRs will however, in the vast majority of cases, be evaluated 
under the rule of reason.20 For a unilateral conduct to be in contrast to 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, it is necessary to establish a specific intent to 
control prices or destroy competition, predatory or anticompetitive conduct 
directed at accomplishing that purpose, a dangerous probability of achieving 
monopoly power and casual antitrust injury.21  
 
                                                
16 U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement 
and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition, p. 1 
17 See Verizon Communications Inc. v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 
(2004) 
18 Lidgard, Hans-Henrik, Competition Classics, p. 16 
19 Ibid.  
20 U.S. DoJ, FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, p. 16 
21 Image Technical Services Inc. v Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F. 3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) 
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2.4 The Cross-Atlantic Development of IPR 
in relation to Competition Law 
In recent decades both the US and the EU have acknowledged the role of 
IPRs in information goods, increasing the awareness of IPR as a significant 
source of creation of wealth and a foundation for success in international 
competition.22  
2.4.1 The European Development 
From a European point of view IPR is primarily a concern for national 
legislation but as EU case law has shown, the Commission “cannot refrain 
from all action when the scope of a patent is relevant for the purposes of 
determining whether there has been an infringement of Article 85 or 86 of 
the Treaty.”23 Accordingly, this also applies to other IPRs, which results in 
competition law to operate as a “second tier” of regulation of IPR.24  
 
In 2005, the Commission undertook a review of Article 102 TFEU, which 
resulted in a discussion paper,25 which sets out possible principles for the 
Commission’s application of Article 102 TFEU to exclusionary abuses.26 It 
was concluded that the Commission would adopt an approach based on the 
likely effects on the market.27 Furthermore, a refusal to license IPRs might 
be classified as an exclusionary abuse, provided the abuse had likely 
anticompetitive effect on the market, which was detrimental to consumer 
welfare. 28 With regards to such abuses, the objective of Article 102 TFEU 
was acknowledged to be the protection of competition on the market for the 
                                                
22 Anderman, Steven, The competition law/IP ’interface’: an introductory note, p. 8 
23 C-193/83, Windsurfing International Inc. v Commission, at para 26 
24 Anderman, Steven, The competition law/IP ’interface’: an introductory note, p. 7 
25 European Commission, DG Competition, Discussion Paper on the application of Article 
82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses 
26 Ibid, at para 1 
27 Ibid, at para 4 
28 European Commission, DG Competition, Discussion Paper on the application of Article 
82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, at paras 207-210 
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enhancement of consumer welfare and the insurance of an efficient 
allocation of resources. 
 
There has also been an investigation concerning the possibility for the EU to 
implement an economic approach concerning Article 102 TFEU made by 
the EAGCP. In the report, it was concluded that an economics-based 
approach was a step in the right direction, and that the focus should be on 
important competitive harms, while at the same time preserving and 
encouraging efficiency. Such approach was held to provide a flexible 
framework, which fostered increased productivity and growth to the benefit 
of consumers.29 The approach was also contended to provide a more 
consistent treatment of practices, where a conduct should be evaluated on 
the basis of its effects rather than the conduct itself.30 An economics-based 
approach would consequently take in consideration the different 
circumstances in a dynamic market.31 
2.4.2 The American Development 
Historically, the American courts have found an unacceptable conduct to 
constitute almost any type, which had an exclusionary effect on actual or 
potential competitors, whereas nowadays, firms are generally allowed to 
achieve or defend a legally acquired monopoly position, using aggressive 
competitive behavior. Current case law and regulatory practice in the US 
may be considered as a reaction against earlier presumptions of 
unlawfulness, which consequently treated any kind of exercise of IPRs with 
suspicion and even hostility.32  
 
The American approach to competition law is generally considered as less 
interventionist than the European approach, only subjecting demonstrably 
harmful activities. If this is not upheld, the American view is that this could 
threaten to discourage the competitive enthusiasm that the US antitrust laws 
                                                
29 EAGCP, An economic approach to Article 82 TFEU, p. 3 
30 Ibid, p. 2 
31 Ibid, p. 3 
32 Eagles, Ian, Longdin, Louise, Refusals to License Intellectual Property, p. 125 
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aim to promote. A competitor should thus not be turned upon if he runs a 
successful business. US case law has stressed that it may sometimes be 
difficult to distinguish competition from conduct with long-term 
anticompetitive effects. Accordingly, US agencies have acknowledged that 
even though IPR typically are welfare enhancing and procompetitive, 
antitrust concerns may nonetheless arise. In such cases the US agencies will 
focus on the actual effects from a firm’s conduct.33 Accordingly, the 
American approach is based on objective economic evidence, and the 
effects in question will be evaluated under the rule of reason. This approach 
considers “[…]whether the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve 
procompetitive benefits that outweigh those anticompetitive effects.” 
However, the Supreme Court has found knowledge of intent helpful in 
interpreting facts and predicting consequences.34  
 
In the Guidelines35 three important principles are embodied:  
 
“[Firstly]for the purpose antitrust analysis, the Agencies regard 
[IPRs] as being essentially comparable to any other form of 
property, [secondly] the Agencies do not presume that [IPRs] 
creates market power in the antitrust context; and [thirdly] the 
Agencies recognize that [IP] licensing allows firms to combine 
complementary factors of production and is generally 
procompetitive.”36 
 
The Supreme Court applied this approach e.g. in Federal Trade Commission 
v Indiana Federation of Dentists,37 which concerned a horizontal agreement, 
in which the parties agreed to withhold dental x rays from third parties. The 
Supreme Court refused to classify such boycott as a per se violation, and 
concluded the restraint be evaluated under the Rule of Reason. 
 
                                                
33 U.S. DoJ, FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, p. 7 
34 Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) 
35 U.S. DoJ, FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property 
36Ibid, pp. 2 f. 
37 Federal Trade Commission v Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) 
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In any case, American Courts of general jurisdiction have been found to be 
ill suited to identify proper prices, quantity and other terms of dealing 
regarding conduct, which is subject to antitrust scrutiny.38 Just as any other 
actor on the market, a monopolist is permitted and encouraged to compete 
aggressively on its merits. Such aggressive competition has been held to be 
precisely the sort of competition, which promotes the consumer interests the 
Sherman Act is intended to foster.39 
 
 
                                                
38 Lidgard, Hans-Henrik, Application of Article 82 EC to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct – 
Refusal to Supply or License, p. 700 
39 Ibid, p. 701 
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3 Compulsory Licensing 
Licensing concerns the situation where the IP holder may not have the 
resources, know-how, or desire to produce or distribute the invented 
product. In such cases, the IP holder has a possibility to license its IPR to 
another party. The starting point is that each firm, which owns an IPR, has 
an original freedom of conduct to enter into licensing agreements with 
whomever they want. Accordingly, such freedom may amount to a refusal 
to license. However, Article 102 TFEU provides certain conditions, which 
must be fulfilled for a refusal to license not to be considered as an abuse. 
Such refusal could otherwise fall within the scope of Article 102(b) TFEU if 
it equates to an imposition of unfair trading conditions or the limitation of 
production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers. 
3.1 Article 102 TFEU and Refusals to 
License 
As mentioned above, one of the main competition rules, working as a mean 
to achieve an internal market, is found in Article 102 TFEU. The article 
targets abusive conduct by one or more dominant undertakings, as 
incompatible with the internal market, provided that trade between Member 
States is affected. For the application of the article it is thus necessary to 
establish a dominant position within the relevant market, an abusive conduct 
and, that there is no objective justification for the conduct in question. It is 
the precondition of a dominant undertaking and an abusive conduct, which 
will be investigated in the following. 
 
Firstly, when determining whether a firm holds a dominant position, it is 
necessary to define the relevant market. This requires a definition of the 
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relevant product or service market, and its geographic dimension.40 In The 
European Commission’s Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market,41 
it is stated that the relevant product or service market should “comprise all 
those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or 
substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products’ characteristics, 
their prices and their intended use.”42 The definition of the relevant product 
market is particularly important for IP holders, as a narrow definition will 
limit a legitimate exploitation of an IPR.43 When defining the relevant 
product market, the Commission in general uses narrow definitions and it 
has, inter alia, found new spare parts to constitute its own product market.44 
The geographic market is then identified in relation to the area in which the 
product in question is marketed. This comprises an area in which, “the 
conditions of competition are sufficiently homogenous and which can be 
distinguished from neighboring areas because the conditions of competition 
are appreciably different in those areas.”45 This view was from the 
beginning established by the CJEU in the United Brands case.46 While 
assessing a firm’s dominance within the relevant market, the CJEU stressed 
the importance of market shares, and held that large market shares are in 
themselves evidence of the existence of a dominant position, save in 
exceptional circumstances.47 In the judgment, the Court confirmed a 
dominant position solely on the grounds of market percentages in the 
eighties. When the market share was no more than in the forties, the Court 
stated that further indications were necessary to establish a dominant 
position. The latter has also been held in the Guidance paper, stating that 
market shares under 40 % provides a fairly safe harbor for undertakings 
                                                
40 Anderman, Steven, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: The 
Regulation of Innovation, pp. 149 f. 
41 Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purpose of Community 
Competition Law, [1997] OJ C372/5, [1998] 4 CMLR 177 
42 Ibid, at para 7 
43 Anderman, Steven, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: The 
Regulation of Innovation, pp. 149 f. 
44 See C-22/78, Hugin v Commission, [1979] ECR 1869 
45 Ibid, at para 8 
46 C-27/76, United Brands v Commission, [1978] ECR 207-315 
47 C-85/76, Hoffman-La Roche v Commission, [1979] ECR 461, at para 47 
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when assessing a potential dominant position.48 The CJEU developed the 
theory of market shares further in AKZO,49 stating that a stable market share 
of 50 % or more was to be considered as a rebuttable presumption of 
dominance.50 
  
Secondly, the conduct of the firm must be abusive. The requirement of an 
abusive conduct states that an achievement of dominance not in itself is 
unlawful. However, once an undertaking holds a position of dominance on 
the market it has a special obligation “not to allow its conduct to impair 
genuine undistorted competition on the common market”.51 Such special 
obligation for a firm may amount to not engaging in exclusionary practice 
on the market.52 Article 102 TFEU gives four examples of what is 
considered to constitute an abuse, which suggest a limitation to a dominant 
firm’s opportunities to exploit customers or consumers. The list is not an 
exhaustive enumeration and the Article has also been interpreted in a wider 
sense as it has been found to apply in situations of exclusionary abuses 
directed at competitors.53 Such exclusionary practice may, inter alia, 
constitute in unilateral or concerted refusals to license, or strategies, which 
may impede dynamic competition in the form of research and marketing of 
follow-on innovation.54 Of relevance for refusals to license is Article 102 
(b), which holds limiting of production, market or technical development to 
the prejudice of consumers as an abuse. However, regarding refusals to 
license, it is important to remember that the Article intends to protect 
consumers and that behavior by a dominant undertaking, which injure 
competitors, will not necessarily injure consumers.55   
                                                
48 The Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying 
Article 82 E.C. Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant undertakings, para 14 
49 C-62/86, AKZO v Commission, [1991] ECR I-3359, paras 59-61 
50 Ibid, at para 60 
51 C-322/81, Michelin v Commission, [1983] ECR 3461, at para 57 
52 Käseberg, Thorsten, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Cumulative Innovation in the 
EU and the US, p. 21 
53 Anderman, Steven, Schmidt, Hedvig, p. 74 
54 Käseberg, Thorsten, p. 22 
55 Craig, Paul, De Búrca, Gráinne, p. 1025 
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3.2 Compulsory Licensing within the EU 
In the Discussion Paper,56 it was concluded that there is no general 
obligation to license an IPR, and that the aim of an IPR is the possibility for 
the IP holder to prevent third parties from using its IPR without consent. If 
the IP holder is imposed an obligation to license such right, the holder 
would be deprived of the very substance of the exclusive right. However, 
the danger of an IP holder gaining a dominant position without the EU being 
able to take actions was not considered to be in line with EU law. Thus, the 
CJEU drew a distinction between the existence and the exercise of an IPR. 
The former would enjoy protection of the Treaty whereas the exercise could 
be subject for EU competition rules.57  
 
Another key feature in the development of compulsory licensing is the 
definition of the relevant market. EU authorities usually make a distinction 
between primary markets, i.e. the relevant market for the protected IPR and 
secondary markets, i.e. those markets for which the IPR is an indispensable 
input.58 The concept of an indispensable input has also been discussed under 
the essential facilities doctrine.59 In principle, the exclusive exploitation of 
an IPR is acceptable when the firm is not trying to extend the scope of the 
granted IPR. An abuse of a dominant position may be at hand if the refusal 
to license means that alternative sources of supply are precluded. Hence, 
exclusive exploitation may constitute legitimate competition on the merits in 
the primary market but may be considered abusive in a secondary market.60 
With that in regard, EU case law has shown that a refusal to license cannot 
in itself constitute an abuse but it is required additional circumstances.61 
                                                
56 DG Competition, Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses 
57 Anderman, Steven, Schmidt, Hedvig pp. 21 f. 
58 Anderman, Steven, Schmidt, Hedvig, p. 95 
59 The essential facilities doctrine targets products or services which are ”[…]either 
essential for the exercise of the activity in question, in that there was no real or potential 
substitute.”, Tiercé Ladbroke SA v Commission, [1997] ECR II-923 at para 131 
60 Anderman, Steven, Schmidt, Hedvig, p. 85 
61 Ibid, paras 238-239 
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This was the case in Volvo v Veng,62 which concerned whether a refusal of 
licensing a registered design for body panels for motor vehicles for the 
import and sales of such products, under special circumstances could be 
considered an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 
of the Treaty. The background to the case was that Volvo was the sole 
proprietor in the UK of a registered design of front wings of Volvo cars. 
Veng, however, had imported the same body panels, without consent from 
Volvo, and marketed them in the UK. As a result, Volvo claimed an 
infringement of its sole and exclusive rights. The CJEU emphasized that the 
use of an exclusive right, which prevented third parties from manufacturing 
and selling, or importing, products was the very core of such exclusive 
right.63 Consequently, a refusal to license could not in itself be considered to 
constitute an abuse of a dominant position. Nevertheless, Article 86 might 
prohibit the exercise of an exclusive right by an undertaking holding a 
dominant position if there was some kind of additional conduct included.64 
This could be the case when the conduct involved constituted an arbitrary 
refusal to supply spare parts to independent repairers, price-fixing of spare 
parts at an unfair level or a decision to no longer produce spare parts for a 
certain model in widespread use.65 The conduct by Volvo meant an 
exclusion of existing competitors while at the same time, denying access to 
new entrants.66 
 
The Discussion Paper also contended that in the assessment of situations 
where a refusal to license might be considered abusive, it must be 
acknowledged that an IPR often is a result of substantial investments, which 
entails significant risks. Consequently, to maintain incentives to invest and 
innovate, the dominant undertaking must not be excessively restricted in the 
exploitation of an IPR. In cases of compulsory licensing, an undertaking 
should thus be free to seek sufficient compensation in order to keep 
                                                
62 C-238/87, Volvo v Veng, [1988] ECR 6211 
63 Ibid, at para 8 
64 Ibid, at para 9 
65 Ibid. 
66 Anderman, Steven, Schmidt, Hedvig, p. 97 
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incentives.67 In situations where a firm has refused to license an IPR, the 
Commission will consider such practice an enforcement priority if; the 
refusal concerns a product which is objectively necessary for an effective 
competition on the downstream market, the refusal likely will lead to 
elimination of effective competition on the downstream market, or the 
refusal is likely to lead to consumer harm.68 
3.2.1 Refusal to License as an Exclusionary 
Conduct 
As mentioned above, refusals to license are only abusive under additional 
circumstances. In Magill,69 which regarded a refusal to license TV-program 
information, three television companies in Ireland and the UK, each 
published weekly program magazines, in which they listed their own 
programs. Magill, an independent company, was prevented from publishing 
a comprehensive TV magazine due to infringement of the TV companies’ 
exclusive rights. As a consequence Magill claimed the conduct of the TV 
companies to be in contrast to Article 86 of the Treaty. In the judgment, the 
CJEU held that only in exceptional circumstances could an exercise of an 
IPR be in contrast to the Articles of the Treaty.70 It was concluded that the 
information needed by Magill was indispensable for the production of a 
comprehensive TV program guide, which also was a new product on the 
market for which there was a clear and unsatisfied consumer demand. 
Additionally, the TV companies reserved for themselves a secondary market 
of weekly television guides by their refusal to license. Lastly, there was no 
objective justification for the refusal.71  With that in regard, the Court 
ordered the companies to license the information, stating that their conduct 
was in contrast to Article 82 of the Treaty. It did not however clarify 
whether the preconditions were cumulative or alternative. 
                                                
67 C-238/87, Volvo v Veng, at para 238 
68 Communication from the Commission, Guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, at para 81 
69 C-241-242/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission (Magill), [1995] ECR I-743, [1995] 
4 CLMR 718 
70 Ibid, at para 50 
71 Ibid, at paras 53-55 
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Regardless, the circumstances in Magill were later upheld in other cases 
such as, Ladbroke.72 In the case the CJEU dealt with the question of a 
refused license by the Sociétés de course to a Belgian company, which 
operated in the business of taking bets on horse races run abroad. The 
alleged abuse constituted a refusal to license a transmittance of live pictures 
and sound by the racecourse operators’ association. Such rights had 
previously been licensed to outlets in France, Germany and Austria. The 
two entities clearly operated on distinct markets. However, Tiercé Ladbroke 
argued with regards to Magill that access must be granted since they 
introduced a new product on the Belgian market.73 CFI took the view that 
licensing entities in neighboring markets did not equate to partitioning the 
market.74 Consequently, the arbitrary refusal to license or the technical 
possibilities of supplying the service in Belgium could not be scrutinized by 
considering policies, which followed in other geographically distinct 
market.75 Since neither Sociétés de course nor Ladbroke were present on the 
Belgian market in which the copyright was to be used, the reference to 
Magill was according to CFI not in point.76 In any case, the CFI concluded 
that Article 82 would not have prohibited the refusal to license: 
 
“Unless it concerned a product or service which was 
either essential for the exercise of the activity in question, 
in that there was no real or potential substitute or was a 
new product whose introduction might be prevented, 
despite specific, constant and regular potential demand on 
the part of consumers.”77 
 
The next case to address the exceptional circumstances test set out in Magill 
was Oscar Bronner,78 which regarded the question of the possibility for a 
                                                
72 T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke v Commission, [1997] ECR II 923 
73 Ibid, at para 13 
74 Ibid, at para 118 
75 Ibid, at para 126 
76 Ibid, at para 130 
77 Ibid, at para. 131 
78 C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GMbH & CO KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftverlag 
GMbH & Co. KG, [1998], ECR I-7791   
 23 
leading national supplier of daily newspaper to deny a competitor access to 
the use of its nationwide home-delivery system distribution service, which 
was the only one in the Member State concerned. The CJEU used the 
conditions laid down by Magill and stated that, whether or not IPRs are 
involved, it is upon the newcomer to establish that access is necessary for its 
business and it is not enough that access merely is desirable.79 
Consequently, access to the home delivery system had to be indispensable 
for the competitor in the daily newspaper market. In the case, the CJEU 
concluded that there were other ways of distributing newspapers and even 
though they were not as advantageous, they were still fully functioning.80 
The Court implied in the case that the conditions laid down by the 
exceptional circumstances test were cumulative as it did not go on to assess 
whether the product in question was to be considered a new product.  
 
In the IMS Health case,81 which regarded a refusal to license access to a 
system called the 1860 brick system, a system containing collected data on 
pharmaceutical sales in Germany. The system had become industry standard 
and was protected by copyright. NDC, a competitor, which had developed 
its own system called the 2201 brick system without success, was refused 
access to IMS Health’s 1860 brick system. In the case, the CJEU affirmed 
the conditions set out in Magill, as well as clarified that they were 
cumulative.82 Accordingly, a refusal to license was to be considered as 
abusive only if the conduct: 
 
I. Prevented the entrance of a new product on the market for which 
there was a potential consumer demand,  
II. Resulted in foreclosure of all competition in a secondary market, 
and 
III. There was no objective justification for the refusal. 
 
                                                
79 Ibid, at para 41, 45 
80 Ibid, at para 43 
81 C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH v NDC Health GmbH, [2004] ECR I-5069 
82 Ibid, at para 38 
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According to case law, there had been a development of an exceptional 
circumstances test, which set out three cumulative conditions under which a 
firm may be compelled to license its IPR. However, in Microsoft,83 where 
the firm had made Microsoft Media Player an integrated part of the 
operating system rather than application software, the General Court 
approached the alleged abuse by Microsoft with a proactive methodology 
and proceeded on the basis that the Magill/IMS factors in fact were not 
exhaustive, only investigating whether the circumstances at hand fitted the 
exceptional circumstances test. The answer was affirmative after a 
comprehensive analysis of the total factual background to Microsoft’s 
refusal to license.84 Microsoft did however make commitments, which were 
accepted by the Commission’s decision.85 Consequently, no further 
investigation was made whether the integration constituted an abusive tying. 
3.3 Compulsory Licensing within the US 
As a starting point, the US antitrust laws do not impose on a firm, to do 
business with anyone, even if a firm holds a dominant position or a 
monopoly. Departure from this principle has not been made solely on 
grounds of ownership of IPR but has required an additional exclusionary 
conduct.86 In general, there is an absolute immunity from antitrust scrutiny 
for dealings or refusal to deal within the scope of the IP grant. There is also 
an evidentiary presumption of virtue that the exercise of an exclusive right 
to prevent others from free-riding on the innovation would be considered as 
a legitimate business reason without inquiry to the motive of a refusal to 
deal, i.e. refusal to license.87 Historically, up to the late 1970s, there had 
been judicial and governmental agency hostility to IPRs and the 
commercialization of it, which amounted to a policy be issued by the 
Department of Justice, stating that certain clauses in patent licenses were 
unlawful, per se, under the antitrust or property misuse doctrine. These 
                                                
83 T-201/04, Microsoft Corporation v Commission, [2007] ECR II-03601 
84 Eagles, Ian, Longdin, Louise, pp. 170 f. 
85 Commission Decision COMP/C-3/39.530 
86 Peritz, Rudolph, p. 200 
87 Eagles, Ian, Longdin, Louise, pp. 148 f. 
 25 
included the so-called “Nine No-No’s”. A common thread in the list was the 
use of an exclusive right outside of the scope that had been granted.88   
 
In Kodak,89 the Supreme Court touched the subject of a refusal to sell or 
license a patented or copyrighted product in the context of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act. In the case, Kodak was alleged to have used its monopoly in 
the market for Kodak photocopier and micrographic parts, and by its 
conduct created a second monopoly in the equipment service markets. The 
Supreme Court stated that an IP holder is not immune from antitrust 
liability, and that an IP holder may refuse to license its protected product. 
Since Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns exclusionary conduct that 
extends monopolies into separate markets, much depended on the definition 
of the patent grant and the relevant market. The Supreme Court concluded 
in the case, that there was no reported case where the Supreme Court had 
imposed antitrust liability for a refusal to license a patent or copyright as 
courts generally do not consider this refusal as an “exclusionary conduct” 
within the meaning of the Sherman Act. However, a right of exclusiveness 
was held to have limits. For instance, a patent did not offer protection if it 
was unlawfully acquired, nor did an IPR protect an attempt to extend lawful 
monopoly beyond the grant of the IPR. Consequently, Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act condemns exclusionary conduct that extends natural 
monopolies into separate markets. The Supreme Court also held that the fact 
that Kodak had refused to license both patented and unpatented parts 
demonstrated that Kodak in fact had not justified its refusal based on its IPR 
in the first place. With that in regard, the Supreme Court imposed antitrust 
liability for Kodak, based on the defendant’s subjective intentions. 
However, in most cases defendants seem to have prevailed against antitrust 
claims involving refusal to license, since US courts generally rely on the 
non-existence of a secondary market as the basis of rejecting a plaintiff’s 
antitrust claim, i.e. the US courts identify the primary and secondary 
markets as being part of the same relevant market, rather than give 
                                                
88 Nimmer, Raymond T., p. 607 
89 Image Technical Services Inc. v Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F. 3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) 
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relevance to the lack of market power in the relevant secondary market. 
Since Kodak, there has not been any alleged monopolization of a single-
brand secondary market based upon Section 2 Sherman Act.90 
 
In ISO v Xerox91, the Supreme Court concluded that antitrust laws could not 
be imposed on a patent owner even if the enforcement of such right may 
have anticompetitive effects. According to the Supreme Court, Xerox could 
not be compelled to license its protected products with regards to Section 
271 (d) Patent Act, 35 § U.S.C. 271 (d) (1999), which stated that a patent 
owner shall not be denied relief, deemed guilty of misuse or illegal 
extension when the conduct constitutes a refusal to license a patent. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to consider whether the refusal 
to license was subjectively motivated, making the presumption that a refusal 
to license was a legitimate business justification. 
 
 
                                                
90 Hendrik, Bourgeois, How to treat aftermarkets under Article 102 TFEU, pp. 352 f. 
91Independent Service Organizations v Xerox Corporation, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 
2000)   
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4 Analysis 
The investigation has demonstrated that both EU and US law acknowledge 
IPR as an important incentive for investment and innovation. Although 
compulsory licensing of an IPR could amount to excessive interference with 
a firm’s proprietary rights, both the Supreme Court and the CJEU have 
found situations, in which a firm has been compelled to license. However, 
the approach of the two systems of law differ, where the CJEU has went 
with a more formalistic approach rather than the rule of reason applied by 
the Supreme Court. Additionally, EU competition law presumes that an 
abusive conduct is in contrast to competition law, with possibilities to 
exempt or justify such conduct either under block exemption regulations or 
Article 101.3 TFEU, whereas US antitrust law distinguishes between 
conduct either prohibited per se or treated under the rule of reason.  
4.1 The Definition of the Relevant Market 
One fundamental aspect to why EU and US law approach compulsory 
licensing from different perspectives, is the definition of the relevant 
market. Both EU law and US law have shown intolerance towards conduct 
by a firm trying to leverage its dominant position on the primary market into 
the secondary market. Hence, a firm is not allowed to extend the scope of an 
IPR into a secondary market. Even though the cross-Atlantic perspectives 
seem to coincide, there is a difference between how the relevant market is 
defined. EU authorities generally define the secondary market to constitute 
its own relevant market whereas US agencies generally do not separate the 
primary and secondary market, but rather regard them as being part of the 
same market. This has as an effect that conduct by a firm, which might be 
considered as an abuse under EU competition law, US antitrust law would 
instead consider the conduct to fall within the primary market of a protected 
IPR, not subjecting the conduct to antitrust scrutiny. The EU approach is in 
some ways questionable. When defining the relevant market, one aspect is 
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to consider the interchangeability between products. The question is 
however if it is reasonable or even possible to separate primary and 
secondary markets, as the EU has done, because of a potential consumer 
demand. I do believe that the answer is more complex than the formalistic 
reasoning applied by the CJEU. Since an IPR is a product, which has 
derived from substantial investments and significant risks, it is in my 
opinion somewhat ignorant to only consider legal aspects when dealing with 
compulsory licensing of an IPR. 
 
A distinction between the primary and secondary market also results in the 
fact that firms active on the European market will have easier to be 
considered to have acquired a dominant position. With this as a starting 
point, it may be argued that a refusal to license equates to an abuse of a 
dominant position within the meaning of Article 102(b) TFEU. Since the 
American definition of the relevant market is interpreted wider than the 
European definition, it is more difficult for American firms to acquire a 
dominant position than it is for European firms. As a matter of fact, the 
conduct, i.e. the use of an IPR, of an American firm will not be subject to 
antitrust scrutiny. 
4.2 The Assessment of Exclusionary 
Conduct 
Both EU and US case law have shown that the mere ownership of an IPR 
does not confer market power upon its proprietor and that this is not 
considered to be in contrast to competition law. Consequently, a refusal to 
license within the scope of the protected IPR is as a starting point not 
considered as an exclusionary conduct. However, when a firm tries to 
leverage its dominant position in the primary market on the secondary 
market, both the EU and the US have recognized such conduct to be in 
contrast to competition law. Hence, a firm is not allowed to extend the scope 
of its IPR into a secondary market.   
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EU case law has shown that a refusal of licensing an IPR could be 
considered as an exclusionary practice within the scope of Article 102 
TFEU under exceptional circumstances. The exceptional circumstances test 
as set out by Magill/IMS in some ways leaves it hard for firms to assess 
whether their conduct may be in contrast to EU competition rules. Since EU 
enforcement is based on the likely effects on the market, foreseeability is 
affected and it is somewhat unclear whether it is sufficient for a firm to 
merely reserve a secondary market for itself, or if it is necessary to also 
leverage its dominant position on the secondary market. Adding more 
complicity to an already complex area, the Microsoft case, deterred from the 
preconditions laid down by Magill/IMS and instead applied a new test of 
balance similar to the rule of reason approach. US case law has shown 
similarities to EU case law where the boiling plate for compulsory licensing 
under US antitrust law is considered to be whether the firm in question has 
tried to reserve a secondary market for itself, which is not covered by the 
granted IPR. This was the case in Kodak, where the refusal to license was 
considered as an exclusionary conduct only because the refusal occurred on 
a secondary market. However, in this judgment the Supreme Court based its 
judgment on the subjective intent of Kodak’s refusal to license. Hence, the 
modern focus of an objective economic analysis of a conduct, which is 
subject to antitrust scrutiny, was disregarded. Much implies therefore that 
the reasoning in Kodak was not in line with modern focus for antitrust 
liability. This is more or less affirmed in ISO v Xerox, where the refusal to 
license in itself was considered as a legitimate business justification.  
 
When a firm holds a dominant position within the relevant market, its 
conduct may be subject to antitrust scrutiny. In order for antitrust liability, 
the EU and the US look for exclusionary practices, which, inter alia, may 
constitute a refusal to license. Such refusal has not been regarded as an 
abuse in itself and EU and US case law have shown that an additional 
exclusionary conduct is required in order to hold a firm liable under 
competition law. However, the approach when assessing such conducts 
differs. European authorities base their decisions on likely effects on the 
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market whereas the American agencies base their decisions on the actual 
effects on the market under the rule of reason test. 
 
One common objective for EU and US competition law is to achieve 
consumer welfare. Nonetheless, the EU approach also has to take in 
consideration the realization of an internal market, which is an objective not 
shared with the US. This has led the EU to apply a more permissive attitude 
towards limiting IPR in order to protect consumers and especially for the 
realization of an internal market. Regarding EU, compulsory licensing and 
the objective of protecting consumer welfare, I do not believe that an IPR 
necessarily equates to harm for consumer welfare. If EU authorities were to 
base their decisions on actual effects on the market just as US agencies do, 
this could lead to positive effects for consumers while at the same time give 
firms a freedom of conduct to use its IPR in whichever way it wants. 
Compulsory licensing has been used as a mean to realize objectives of 
competition and consumer welfare but it also comes with a risk that such 
licensing will only protect competitors. Just as the EAGCP report pointed 
out, an economics-based approach would consider all the different 
circumstances in a dynamic market and by this reflect the actual market 
situation. Consequently, a firm would be able to assess its future conduct on 
the market, by weighing in not only legal aspects but also economical ones. 
4.3 The Cross-Atlantic View on 
Compulsory Licensing 
To summarize, the view on IPRs in relation to competition law on the two 
sides of the Atlantic have many similarities. However, the history of the two 
systems of law differs, where the EU has derived from an idea of an internal 
market and the principle of free movement of goods. This has, inter alia, 
resulted in efforts trying to preserve opportunities for small and medium-
sized firms as well as trying to protect consumer interest. The US has 
instead applied a more casual approach to bigger firms and encourages such 
firms to compete aggressively on their merits.  
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Case law has shown that the EU approach has been less technical and more 
formalistic than the US approach and in some ways the later approach might 
be preferable in order to keep incentives for firms to continue to invest and 
innovate. When challenging refusals to license with competition law, it has 
to be considered that this might have potential negative effects on 
innovation, which is the very aim for granting an IPR. Compelling a firm to 
license its IPR means that the time, effort and money put into the 
development or improvement of a product might not be worth it in the long 
run. If a compulsory license results in loosing the incentive for innovation, it 
is questionable whether this is an appropriate remedy for competition 
violation.  
 
In my opinion, when arguments put forward, like the EU approach, 
constantly are based on a hypothetical basis, they also come with a risk of 
arguments not being a true reflection of reality. There may not be a practical 
difference between the two systems of law in the results of the application 
of competition law in relation to IPRs but the approach in the arguments is 
of fundamental value. Provided that both competition law and IPRs will 
increase innovation and economic growth, it is important that both bodies of 
law are protected and given a margin of interpretation in order to create a 
well functioning market. Since EU case law has been shown to be somewhat 
ambiguous of when the use of an IPR may be in contrast to competition 
rules, it will be hard for a firm to assess whether if its future business 
strategy involving an IPR will be in line with competition law. An 
uncertainty, which I believe, cannot be considered positive for innovation 
and economic growth.  
 
However, just because a firm has acquired an IPR it should not, as case law 
on both sides of the Atlantic has pointed out, be completely protected by its 
granted IPR and thus immune to antitrust scrutiny. When a firm is trying to 
extend the scope of its IPR it is reasonable that competition rules may limit 
the IPR for the protection of competition objectives. For this purpose, a 
compulsory license may work as enforcement for such protection, as long as 
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it is well motivated. Additionally, it can also be argued that a rule of reason 
approach makes it difficult to adopt any general rules, which possibly could 
decrease foreseeability for actors on the market. It is however my belief that 
if a firm achieves to realize the main objective of consumer welfare, the 
means of achievement, at least regarding refusals to license, should not be 
the main focus but instead the positive effects for consumers. Consequently, 
it would be preferable if the EU applied a more economics-based approach 
as this could open up doors for a conduct not to be considered as an abusive 
conduct within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, when the conduct in fact 
has positive effects.   
 
In conclusion, where EU law is formalistic, US law is open for the 
possibility that even aggressive competitive behavior may amount to 
beneficial consequences for competition objectives and it is important to 
remember that compulsory licensing does not necessarily equate to being 
beneficial for consumer welfare. Compulsory licensing may in some cases 
be an efficient enforcement of competition law, but just as well, it might be 
just as good a solution to let dominant firms compete aggressively on their 
merits, by using IPRs, if the conduct results in consumer welfare. 
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